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CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATION OF PAST DUE AND
FUTURE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
One parent is given custody of two children, a daughter and a
son. The other parent is ordered to pay monthly child support in
the amount of $500. This arrangement is agreeable to both par-
ties and continues with few problems for several years. Then cir-
cumstances change. The daughter wants to live with her father.'
The parties orally agree that the daughter can live with her father
and he can reduce the support payments to $250 per month. The
parties abide by the oral agreement for the duration of the daugh-
ter's minority. As the daughter reaches majority, the mother sues
for past due support payments equivalent to the $250 per month
not paid for the daughter throughout the years the daughter lived
with her father.2 The court is now faced with the decision of
whether to enforce the oral agreement or invalidate it because the
parties did not have prior court approval. A different situation in
which the court would have the same dilemma is when the parties
contract for the father to pay money directly into a savings
account for higher education expenses and agree not to use the
monthly payments for current expenses. Increasingly, fact pat-
terns and questions such as these are confronting the courts and
challenging them to define how they will view independent con-
tracts, written or oral, made between parents for the support of
their children.
This comment will address the custodial parent's right to con-
tract with the supporting parent to modify court-ordered child
support payments.3 Part II discusses how the courts have classi-
1. In this article the supporting parent will be identified as the father and
the custodial parent will be referred to as the mother. Any fact patterns to the
contrary will be expressly identified.
2. The general fact pattern of the story comes from Dubroc v. Dubroc, 388 So.
2d 377 (La. 1980).
3. This comment will not address statutory law surrounding child support.
The exception will be for those statutes reported in the cases. Readers should be
aware of the statutory laws of their states concerning this matter. Additionally,
the following are not within the scope of this comment: The method in which
courts modify child support orders. See C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Change in
Financial Condition or Needs of Parents or Children as Ground for Modification
of Decree for Child Support Payments, 89 A.L.R.2d 7 (1963). The acts of children
1
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fled contracts made to settle past due child support payments. It
will also explain the defenses that some courts recognize and util-
ize to protect the supporting parent when the courts refuse to
enforce the contracts. Part III discusses the different rationales
for either enforcing or invalidating contracts that modify future
child support payments.4 Part IV recommends that the courts
allow parents to contractually modify payments and that the
courts use traditional contract principles, combined with a best
interests of the child test, to determine the validity of each
contract.
II. PAST DUE SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Some courts have been reluctant to allow parties to contractu-
ally modify arrearage.5 Other courts recognize the agreements
because they consider the arrearage to be a debt owed to the cus-
todial parent or as referred to by the courts: the judgment credi-
tor. What follows is a discussion of how the different courts have
dealt with the agreements between the parties, with an emphasis
on a Texas Supreme Court case which sets forth the two conflict-
ing views. The traditional view is that parents may not form a
contract that affects child support payments. The modern and
minority view does allow parents to modify payments if it is in the
best interests of the children.
A. Courts Not Allowing Parties to Contractually Settle
Arrearage
The courts that void contracts between parties to waive
arrearage do so on the premise that the support payments are for
the sole benefit of the child and neither the trial court nor the par-
ents have the power to waive a child's right to payment. 6 Courts
that modify or terminate child support. See Michael J. Greene, Annotation,
What Voluntary Acts of Child, Other Than Marriage or Entry Into Military
Service, Terminate Parent's Obligation to Support, 32 A.L.R.3d 1055 (1970). Any
right by a spouse to offset debts against support payments or to unilaterally
reduce amount of payments. See Claudia Catalano, Annotation, Spouse's Right
to Set Off Debt Owed by Other Spouse Against Accrued Spousal or Child Support
Payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259 (1993).
4. The situations presented in the introduction of this comment are
examples of agreements about future support payments.
5. Arrearage is money that is overdue and owed to the custodial parent.
6. See Frasemer v. Frasemer, 578 So. 2d 1346, 1349 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)
("[A] mother may not waive support payments due a minor child from the child's
father under a decree of the court, nor may support provisions of the decree be
[Vol. 19:189190
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find support for this proposition in their public policy, statutes
and case law.
Vander Woude v. Vander Woude is an example of how a court
will read into its state statutes a requirement that any agreement
that waives child support obligations must be in writing and, more
importantly, pre-approved by the courts.7 The reasoning is as fol-
lows: Parents have a duty, imposed by public policy and statute,"
to support their children. "Statutorily, courts and administrative
nullified by agreement between the parties."); Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 371
S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) ("Past due support installments become
vested as they accrue and are thereafter immune from change. Parties cannot
contractually modify the terms of a support order without the court's approval.").
7. Vander Woude v. Vander Woude, 501 N.W.2d 361, 363 (S.D. 1993) (Donna
and Robert were divorced in 1974 and Donna retained custody of their two
daughters. Robert stayed current with his support payments until 1987 when he
was laid off from his job. In 1988, Robert returned to his job and eventually
resumed payments but he did miss a significant number of payments following
his return to work. In 1990, Donna wrote Robert about the arrearage owing on
their second daughter and threatened legal action. She also stated: "No more
support after that! I know that has got to be a thorn out of your side." Id. at 363.
Robert wrote Donna a check, which Donna cashed, but she wrote back "that
while she had thought of letting the earlier child support arrearage of $5,227.50
pass [amount due for arrearage on first daughter], she now regretted that
decision." Id. Subsequently, Donna brought this action to recover the
arrearage.).
8. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-5-18.1 (Michie 1992). The statute reads as
follows:
The parents of any child are under a legal duty to support their child in
accordance with the provisions of § 25-7-6.1, until the child attains the
age of eighteen, or until the child attains the age of nineteen if he is a
full-time student in a secondary school.
See also S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-7-6.1 (Michie 1992). The statute reads as
follows:
The parents of a child are jointly and severally obligated for the
necessary maintenance, education and support of the child in
accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court
order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to
furnish maintenance, education and support for his child, following a
continued absence from the home, is the obligor's share of the amount
shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the
absence. For the purposes of this section, "continued absence from the
home," means that the parent or child is physically absent from the
home of a period of at least thirty consecutive days, and that the nature
of the absence constitutes family dissociation because of a substantial
severance of marital and family ties and responsibilities, resulting in
the child losing or having a substantial reduction of physical care,
communication, guidance and support from the parent.
3
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entities may not retroactively modify past due child support obli-
gations except for the period in which there is a pending petition
for modification."9 While that statute did not address modification
by parents, the court read it in connection with a second statute10
that does not allow parents to affect the rights of a social services
agency to collect from parents any support the agency has pro-
vided, unless the parent's agreement concerning support was in
writing and approved by the court." Therefore, when the court
read the statutes together, it found that parents do not have the
right to retroactively modify support payments without court
approval. Since the agreement in this case was neither in writing
nor approved by the court, it was not enforceable.' 2 Thus, the
court ruled that parents are "without authority to modify or for-
give . . . child support arrearage without court approval."13
Other courts have also held, according to their statutes, that
private agreements are unenforceable. 14 One court even held that
a trial court may not "permit the parties to accomplish privately
what the court could not have ordered."' 5 Therefore, since a court
may not modify arrearages, the parents cannot circumvent the
court to reach the same result. Another court has cited public pol-
9. Vander Woude, 501 N.W.2d at 363, (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-7.3
(1992)). S.D. Codified Laws § 25-7-7.3 reads as follows:
Any past due support payments are not subject to modification by a
court or administrative entity of this state, except those accruing in any
period in which there is pending a petition for modification of the
support obligation, but only from the date that notice of hearing of the
petition has been given to the obligee, the obligor, and any other party
having an interest in such matter.
10. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-7A-17 (Michie 1992). The statute reads as
follows:
An agreement between parents or other responsible persons relieving a
party of any duty of support or responsibility or purporting to settle
past, present or future support obligations as settlement or prepayment
may not act to reduce or terminate any rights of the department of social
services or any support obligee to recover from parents or other
responsible persons for support provided, unless the department or any
support obligee has consented to the agreement in writing and the
agreement has been approved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
11. Vander Woude, 501 N.W.2d at 363.
12. Id. at 364.
13. Id.
14. See Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin. et al., 591 A.2d 501
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Goodpasture, 371 S.E.2d 845; Whicker v. Whicker, 711
S.W.2d 857 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
15. Whicker, 711 S.W.2d at 860.
192 [Vol. 19:189
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icy as forbidding the parties from waiving liability for past or
future child support payments. 16
In all of these cases, 17 the parties to the agreement should
have gone to the courts to have their agreements approved. This
does not guarantee that the courts will adopt the agreement,
because there still exist courts that will not approve the agree-
ment due to the belief that neither the parents nor the courts may
retroactively alter vested child support payments.' As will be
shown in subsection B, this view does not accurately reflect the
true nature of child support arrearage.
B. Courts Allowing Parties to Contractually Settle Arrearage
There exists another line of cases that allows the custodial
parent and the supporting parent to enter private agreements to
settle past due child support payments. The overall reasoning is
that arrearage is the amount due to the custodial parent and not
the child, since the child has already received support from the
custodial parent. The arrearage is simply a reimbursement to the
custodial parent for money already spent on the children.
Lindsey v. Lindsey asked and answered the question: "Can
the payee voluntarily waive, give, release, compromise, sell,
enforce, or do nothing with his or her right to collect past-due
court-ordered child support payments from the payor? Yes."' 9
The reasoning behind Lindsey's holding is that as support pay-
ments become due and payable the custodial parent becomes a
decree creditor.20
The designated payee of past-due court-ordered child support is a
decree creditor and, like a judgment creditor, can do whatever he
or she wants with the decree receivable subject, however, to the
family court's superior interest in child's present and future wel-
16. Stambaugh, 591 A.2d at 503-04 (bargaining for waiver of past due
payments in exchange for a consent to the adoption of the children).
17. See supra notes 6, 7 and 14.
18. Whicker, 711 S.W.2d at 860.
19. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 716 P.2d 496, 498 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986).
20. Id. at 500.
1996] 193
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fare. 2 The decree creditor may waive, give, release, compromise,
sell, enforce, or do nothing with his or her decree receivable.
22
It is logical to call the custodial parent a decree creditor when it is
understood that the child is still being supported even when the
supporting parent falls behind in payments. The needs of the
child do not stop simply because one parent is not providing the
financial support. The other parent must make up the difference
and, hopefully, be reimbursed later by the supporting parent.
Another theory is that the custodial parent stands in a
trustee-like position for the child because the support payments
are created for the benefit and protection of the child.2 3 When the
custodial parent actually supports the child over time and dis-
charges the liability of the trust, the judgment accrues to the par-
ent who discharged the debt and not to the child.24 Therefore, if
the settlement or compromise is supported by adequate considera-
tion, the courts will enforce it.
2 5
Again, this analysis by the court is reasonable because the
children have already received the care and support from the cus-
todial parent; any action for arrearage would simply be repaying
the custodial parent for expenses incurred up to the agreement or
21. It should be noted that the court is not disregarding the best interests of
the child. The court will examine the agreement waiving arrearage to be sure
that the interests of the child have not been jeopardized. Yet, the courts are still
giving the parents the opportunity to reach an agreement that is in the best
interest of all parties concerned.
22. Lindsey, 716 P.2d at 500.
23. Miller v. Miller, 565 P.2d 382 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (The wife signed a
satisfaction and made an oral agreement eliminating an accrued child support
judgment.). The concurring opinion in Miller gives an overview of the different
holdings of the jurisdictions regarding contracts on past due child support. Id. at
385.
24. Miller, 565 P.2d at 385. ("Where a child has in the past been supported by
a single parent any right of action against the noncontributing parent lies not
with the child but with the parent who has provided the support."). Accord
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 505 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) ("Our courts have,
however, for a long time recognized that past due child support owing by the
divorced husband to the former wife pursuant to a court order for child support
and maintenance incorporated into the divorce decree constitutes a debt of the
husband to the former wife [cite omitted], and they become judgments in favor of
the former wife.").
25. Rodgers, 505 S.W.2d at 144. But see Miller, 565 P.2d at 384 (absence of
consideration did not make the agreement invalid because a debt may be the
subject of a gift to the debtor and the court will recognize if the donee has the
requisite donative intent or complies with the statutes regulating satisfaction of
a debt).
[Vol. 19:189
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the law suit. It should be left to the custodial parent's discretion
to enforce the court order or settle for a different amount. The
custodial parent should have the option of increasing future pay-
ments in consideration for waiving his right to go to court to seek
arrearage. The custodial parent has a strong bargaining position,
because if the supporting parent offers an unfair settlement, the
custodial parent has the threat of court enforcement of the origi-
nal support order.
C. The Case of Williams v. Patton
Williams v. Patton sets out the different policies that courts
struggle with in deciding whether to enforce the agreements on
past due and future child support payments.2 6 The majority and
concurring opinions represent the more traditional view that par-
ents may not form a contract that affects child support payments.
The dissenting opinion reflects the modern trend of allowing par-
ents to contract regarding child support payments, as long as the
contract is in the best interests of the child.27
1. The Facts
Houson Patton and Sherry Williams were divorced in 1974.28
Sherry received custody of their daughter and Houson was
ordered to pay $121 per month in child support.29 Houson did not
pay support for several years and in 1985 he was $9,885 in
arrears."° At that time, Sherry filed a motion for contempt and a
motion to modify child support.3'
Sherry and Houson entered into a settlement agreement
where Houson agreed to pay $2,850 in a lump sum, as well as to
increase child support payments to $325 per month for 18 months
and then to $350 a month until their daughter was emancipated
or reached 18 years of age.32 Following this agreement, Sherry
agreed to dismiss the contempt action with prejudice and to for-
give the arrearage.3 3 In 1986 the trial court signed an "Agreed
Order Modifying Prior Order" and an order dismissing the con-
26. Williams v. Patton, 821 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1991).
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id. at 141.
29. Id. at 141-42.
30. Id. at 142.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
19961 195
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tempt motion.3 4 The trial court's order increased the monthly
payments, but did not release Houson's obligation to pay arrear-
age nor did the orders refer to or acknowledge the settlement
agreement.3 5
Houson paid his $2,850 and abided by the agreement for a
year and a half, then he stopped paying child support when his
daughter moved into his home.3 6 Sherry brought a second action
for contempt in 1988 for the nonpayment since 1987 and for the
period at issue in the first lawsuit.3 7 Houson defended with the
settlement agreement for the earliest arrearage and filed a peti-
tion against Sherry for breach of contract.31 Sherry then cross-
claimed for breach, because Houson had stopped paying support
in 1987. 39
The trial court found the agreement to be void, entered a take
nothing judgment and sentenced Houson to fifteen days in jail for
contempt, but suspended the sentence.40 Houson appealed to the
court of appeals and that court affirmed, stating that an agree-
ment "may not be modified by the parties without court approval
until the court either (1) reduces the unpaid child support to writ-
ten judgment or (2) loses jurisdiction."4 1 Houson then appealed to
the Texas Supreme Court, which affirmed the court of appeals. 42
2. The Majority and Concurring Opinion
The majority and concurring opinions articulated three rea-
sons for not allowing parents to enter contracts settling past due
child support payments. The first reason is that the courts want
to shield the custodial parent from financial pressures. 43 Typi-
cally, the custodial parent is the mother,44 and she encounters a
greater decline in her economic position in society following a
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id. at 146.
43. Id. at 144.
44. None of the cases cited in this comment contained a fact pattern in which
the father was granted custody in the original proceeding.
[Vol. 19:189
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divorce.45 The decline in the mother's economic status does affect
the children and accounts for part of the reason that children
make up such a large part of the indigent of this country.46 Addi-
tionally, it is generally only through remarriage that the woman
has any chance to reach the same income level as she would have
enjoyed if she had remained married. 4 7 The ex-husband does not
encounter this problem because "most men who divorce or sepa-
rate are immediately better off because they retain most of their
labor incomes, typically do not pay large amounts of alimony and
child support to their ex-wives, and no longer have to provide for
the level of needs associated with their former families. "
48
Many studies 49 seem to support the majority's position, but
the majority did not take into account findings that after the first
year of divorce child support and alimony contributed to an insig-
nificant proportion of the custodial parent's income. 50 Even in
attempting to protect women from themselves, the court has not
completely taken away the women's right to settle arrearage, for
after adjudication the parents may settle the judgment entered by
the court. The court has simply added the extra expense of having
to go to court before the parties may settle the claim.
The concurring opinion by Justice Cornyn adds the second
and third reasons why parents should not be allowed to contract
with each other absent court approval. The second is that to allow
the parties to contract without court approval will disrupt state
45. See Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the
Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, DEMOGRAPHY 22(4): 485-97
(1985). [hereinafter Duncan and Hoffman] (On the whole, women lose 30% to
46% of their income immediately following a divorce.). See also Robert S. Weiss,
The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-Parent
Households, J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAm. 46(1), 115 (1984). [hereinafter Weiss].
46. Duncan and Hoffman, supra note 45, at 485.
47. See Kate J. Stirling, Women Who Remain Divorced: The Long-Term
Economic Consequences, Soc. Sci. Q. 70(3): 549, 560 (1989). ("The gains from
remarriage for divorced women relative to those who remain divorced, are
substantial."); Duncan and Hoffman, supra note 45, at 485 (economic impact of
divorce is less severe when allowing for remarriage).
48. Duncan and Hoffman, supra note 45, at 495.
49. See generally Stirling, supra note 47; Duncan and Hoffman, supra note
45; Weiss, supra note 45.
50. Weiss, supra note 45, at 122. (During the first year following divorce child
support and alimony contribute to 20% to 40% of total family income but in
subsequent years the amount drops to an insignificant proportion of income.
Also, it is primarily the middle and higher income levels that receive the higher
payments.).
1971996]
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and federal schemes5 1 of child support. 52 The example the opinion
gives is that participants in the Texas AFDC program must assign
their rights to receive child support to the state agency. 3 As to
disrupting the state and federal schemes, a simple solution would
be to rule that the parties may not contractually modify or settle
the rights which they have assigned to the agencies. The agency
would step into the shoes of the custodial, non-supporting parent
and receive the right to contract about arrearage and future sup-
port payments.
The third reason for not allowing the parties to contract pri-
vately is that it would render child support enforcement policies
toothless. 54 Congress gave overdue payments the status of judg-
ments that are entitled to full faith and credit in other states.
55
"Congress's goal appears to have been threefold: to aid in the
interstate enforcement of child support orders, to encourage
timely requests for modification based on changed circumstances,
and to discourage the type of self-help in which the obligor and
obligee have indulged here."56 None of these goals would be jeop-
ardized if the court allowed the parties to contract without prior
court approval. The judgments would still be given full faith and
credit and they would be subject to the same rule as any other
settlement, one in which the parties would be able to give release
and satisfaction. 57 Additionally, allowing the parties to contract
in regard to past due child support payments does not prevent the
parties from asking the court for a modification. The use of a con-
tract could advance other policies of importance to the courts,
those of judicial economy and efficiency.
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Phillips, in his dissenting opinion, argued that
the majority, by requiring court approval of child support con-
tracts, imposed "a time consuming and expensive procedure, with
little or no corresponding benefit to [the parents], their offspring
51. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601-617 (1994);
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
52. Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 151-52 (Cornyn, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 151-52.
57. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:189198
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or society."58 The court in the majority opinion did not deny the
parties the right to contract between themselves but the effect of
the ruling will cause the parents to spend additional legal fees,
delay the time until the matter is settled and waste judicial econ-
omy.59 The problems that the majority articulates in its opinion 60
still exist because after the court reduces the arrearage to a judg-
ment the parties still retain the power to settle the claim. No rule
exists which prevents the supporting parent from overreaching
after the adjudication. The only difference between the two situa-
tions is that there is now a court-ordered judgment against the
supporting parent. However, the custodial parent's right to the
payments existed prior to any court proceeding for "past due sup-
port payments are owed to the custodial parent as reimbursement
for the amounts which have necessarily already been expended for
the support of the child."6' Thus, the best protection that can be
given the parties is to allow them to contractually settle arrearage
without costly prior judicial approval.
III. FUTURE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
The courts are split over whether to allow parents to contrac-
tually modify future child support payments. Contracts for future
payments present different issues than contracts on arrearage
because the parents are contracting for care and support that has
not yet been given and circumstances could change. This is one of
the reasons that some courts do not enforce such agreements.
However, even the courts that do not enforce the contracts allow
the supporting parent to raise various defenses.62
A. Courts Not Allowing Modification
The general rule is that parties may not agree to relieve one
parent of his obligation to pay child support. 3 This general rule
58. Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 152 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 153.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 43-57.
61. Id. See also cases cited therein.
62. E.g., equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, waiver, and acquiescence.
63. Kimble v. Kimble, 341 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1986) (may not modify,
suspend, or terminate a decretal child support obligation); Peebles v. Disher, 310
S.E.2d 823 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983) (private agreement does not bar mother from
enforcing child support order). See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Annotation, Validity and Effect, as Between Former Spouses, of Agreement
Releasing Parent from Payment of Child Support Provided for in an Earlier
Divorce Decree, 100 A.L.R.3d 1129 (1980).
1996] 199
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has in some cases been established by a statute which supercedes
previous cases holding that agreements are enforceable if in the
best interests of the child." The courts articulate several other
reasons for this rule. Most of the reasons are based on the public
policy that courts must protect the best interests of the child. 5
Consequently, the courts have required that court approval must
be given to all agreements to modify child support before the
agreements are valid and enforceable.6 6
Public policy requires that parents may not deprive children
of support to which they are entitled.6 v The courts want to serve
the best interests and welfare of the child; therefore, the child,
including an adopted child, will not be bound by any contract that
the parents enter concerning support which is not approved by the
court.6 8
A second reason that courts will not enforce a private agree-
ment regarding future child support is that it would foreclose the
court from exercising its judgment as to child support. 69 As one
court stated: "to hold otherwise would destroy the power of our
courts to reject inadequate, overreaching, unconscionable or other-
64. See In re Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755 (Iowa 1994) (By statute,
any modification of a child support order is void unless approved by the court.
This statute overruled previous court decisions that allowed private agreements
if the agreements were in the best interests of the child.); Sullivan v. Edes, 801
S.W.2d 32 (Ark. 1990) (Prior to 1987, courts would recognize agreement to reduce
future child support payments if supported by valid consideration and not
inequitable. However, since the passage of the statute, parties may no longer
modify support without court intervention.).
65. See Robinson v. McKinney, 432 S.E.2d 543 (W. Va. 1993) (ensure that the
best interests of the child are considered).
66. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 625 N.E.2d 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993);
Lownds v. Lownds, 551 A.2d 775 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988) (Court held that an
order of support can be modified only by the court and not by a private agreement
between parities to reduce child support payments.).
67. See Calton v. Calton, 485 So. 2d 309 (Miss. 1986) (public policy will not
allow parents to contract away the vested right of a child to support); Shackleford
v. Shackleford, 572 So. 2d 468, reh'g overruled, 1990 Ala. Civ. App. Lexis 420
(Ala. Civ. App.), and cert. denied, without op., Ex Parte Shackleford, 1990 Ala.
Lexis 1144 (Ala. 1990); Blisset v. Blisset, 495 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 526 N.E.2d 125 (Ill. 1988) (public policy imposes a duty
of support on parents that cannot be bargained away).
68. In re Marriage of Ayo, 235 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458, 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(adoptive father, now ex-husband, attempted to rescind the adoption and support
duty once the natural father began to visit the child again).
69. Meredith v. Meredith, 234 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1977).
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wise invalid alimony and child custody settlement agreements."70
A corollary reason for holding that agreements are invalid is that
they interrupt the continuing jurisdiction of the court over the
minor.7 ' Therefore, courts are not bound by agreements where
the welfare of the children is concerned.72
These reasons may be valid in regard to the court's concern
over the welfare of the child. However, the welfare of the child is
not always put at risk when parents reach a private agreement
unapproved by the courts. Realizing this some courts allow
defenses in equity to protect the supporting parent 73 and other
courts allow private agreements. 4
B. Defenses that Courts Allow When They Do Not Enforce the
Contracts
The jurisdictions that forbid parties from contracting between
themselves regarding future child support payments have none-
theless recognized certain defenses in equity. 5 These defenses
are closely related to each other, and the courts will often discuss
more than one at a time. One of these defenses is waiver. The
elements for waiver are: (1) abandonment of the support claim by
the custodial parent; (2) waiting an unreasonable amount of time
before reasserting the claim; and (3) prejudice to the supporting
parent who owes the support duty.v6
70. Davis v. Davis, 306 S.E.2d 247, 249 (Ga. 1983) (Contemporaneously with
the court decree of child support of $450, the parties entered into a written
agreement, not approved by the court, for former wife to pay a percentage of
profits from business, not to exceed $450, to former husband. Subsequently, they
entered into an agreement not to exchange checks for $450, thus negating the
child support. The mother then sued for arrearages.).
71. Napoleon v. Napoleon, 585 P.2d 1270 (Haw. 1978). Accord Blisset v.
Blisset, 526 N.E.2d 125 (Ill. 1988) (agreements unenforceable because
"undermine and circumvent the court's role in the establishment and
modification of a child support obligation").
72. In re Marriage of Neiss, 743 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1987) (agreement for ex-
husband to pay a total of $12,000 in quarterly installments in return for a release
of future child support and maintenance obligations).
73. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
75. For a complete overview of defenses for alimony and child support see
generally John C. Williams, Annotation, Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, so as
to Bar Recovery of Arrearage of Permanent Alimony or Child Support, 5
A.L.R.4th 1015 (1981).
76. Cordova v. Lucero, 629 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (Mother
wrote letter to father that her new husband was going to adopt the children and
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Another defense allowed by some courts, and related to
waiver, is acquiescence to non-payment by the custodial parent.77
The courts have not set out a clear test for determining acquies-
cence, but one court has identified it as an application of the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel. 7s An example of the application of the
doctrine comes from Davidson v. Van Lengen .7 In 1956 the court
granted the parents a divorce in which it gave the mother custody
of the son and ordered that the father pay $10 per week in semi-
monthly installments until their son turned 18 years old.80 Dur-
ing that summer, the mother approached the father and they
came to an agreement that if the father stopped visitations he
would not have to pay support."' The new husband would support
the son.82 The mother did not seek any child support payments for
nearly twenty years.8 3 The court stated that the doctrine of
waiver by acquiescence applies "where a person knows or ought to
know that she is entitled to enforce her right.., and neglects to do
so for such a time as would imply that she intended to waive or
abandon her right."8 4 Here the mother knew that she had an
enforceable right but she did not enforce it and beyond that she,
through her actions, expressed to the father an intent to waive her
rights to the child support payments.8 5 Upon these facts the court
found that while parties may not contractually modify child sup-
port payments without court approval, the mother had acquiesced
that they no longer wanted support money from the father or for him to visit the
children. Father did not pay any support for three and a half years following
receipt of the letter. The mother sued for arrearage of $6,000.).
77. For a list of courts allowing and not allowing acquiescence as a defense see
Williams, supra note 75.
78. Sutton v. Schwartz, 808 S.W.2d 15, 18, appeal after remand, 820 S.W.2d
71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), appeal after remand, remanded mot. granted, 860 S.W.2d
833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (Based on agreement to reduce payments when daughter
moved from mother's home, the court found that mother had waived by
acquiescence the right to full child support payments as decreed by the court.).
79. Davidson v. Van Lengen, 266 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1978).
80. Id. at 437.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 438 (There was evidence presented that she did speak with an
attorney in regards to the matter but no action was ever taken beyond a few
letters or phone calls; the attorney was not even sure if either action had actually
been taken.).
84. Id. at 438.
85. Id. at 440.
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to the nonpayment and was barred from now enforcing any court
order for payment.8 6
A third defense allowed by the courts is equitable estoppel . 7
In this defense the father must show that he reasonably relied, to
his detriment, upon acts of another which induced the father not
to pay child support."" A corollary doctrine, also recognized by
some courts, is promissory estoppel., 9 The difference is that in
promissory estoppel the reliance is on a promise and not an act.
Some courts add the element that equity requires the court to give
the father relief.90
These are a few of the defenses that the courts have utilized
to protect the supporting parent when he has relied on an agree-
ment between himself and the custodial parent. The simpler
method would be as one court has stated to "give effect to agree-
ments between spouses to reduce or waive support, particularly
where.., the supporting parent changes his position for the worse
in reliance on the agreement"91 and the child is not lacking in
"material needs or parental guidance."9 2 This would save the
trouble of establishing doctrines such as those discussed, which
are similar to the legislatively created justifiable cause,9 3 and
instead they could use established principles of contract law to
determine the validity of any oral or written agreement. The chil-
86. Davidson, 266 N.W.2d 436.
87. Equitable estoppel occurs when the custodial parent is estopped by her
conduct from asserting her right to child support payments which she otherwise
would have had. BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 538 (6th ed. 1990).
88. See Harms v. Harms, 498 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Wis. 1993) (Court enforced an
extra-judicial agreement relieving the non-custodial parent of future child
support through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.); Hartman v. Smith, 674 P.2d
176, 178 (Wash. 1984) (apply principles of equitable estoppel when the child's
interests are not at risk); In re Marriage of Dennin, 811 P.2d 449, 450 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991) (father may assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel when he relied
on agreement to stop child support in exchange for giving consent to adoption).
89. Promissory estoppel "arises when there is a promise which [the custodial
parent as] promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on part of [the supporting parent,] the
promisee, and which does induce such action or forbearance, and such promise is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of a promise." BLACes
LAw DICTIONARY 1214 (6th ed. 1990).
90. In re Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755, 756-57 (Iowa 1994) (oral
agreement that while son lived with father, the father would not be required to
pay child support to the mother).
91. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 389 N.E.2d 15, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
92. Id. at 16.
93. Ehrman v. Moser, 253 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
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dren's best interests would be protected, because the court is free
to determine that the contract does not jeopardize the child's right
to material needs or guidance, regardless of which parent actually
meets those needs.
C. Courts Allowing Modification
A small minority of jurisdictions allow the parties to modify
court orders for payment of child support. Currently two state
courts94 enforce contracts between parents to modify future child
support payments.9 5 The principal case of each jurisdiction will
be discussed within this section, along with the reasons for enforc-
ing such a contract.
Dubroc v. Dubroc, a Louisiana case, involved an agreement
for the father to reduce child support during the time that the son
lived with the father. The Dubroc's were divorced in January
1975.96 Ms. Moga (formerly Dubroc) received custody of the two
children, Aubry and Deborah, and Mr. Dubroc was ordered to pay
child support of $250 per month.97 Then Ms. Moga no longer
wanted custody of Aubry, so the parties agreed that Aubry would
live with his father and Mr. Dubroc would only pay $125 per
month in child support. 98 This agreement continued until Ms.
Moga filed an action for arrearages. 99
The trial court ordered Mr. Dubroc to pay $4,500 in arrear
ages, but the court of appeals reversed. 100 Ms. Moga appealed to
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which affirmed the court of
appeals. 101 The Louisiana Supreme Court allowed the agreement
because it did not threaten the child's best interests. 0 2 The court
recognized the policy reasons for not allowing the agreements,
such as sanctity of child custody and support judgments, orderly
process of law and to prevent "self-help" on the part of the
father. 0 3 The court did not deny that parents have a duty to sup-
94. These are two cases where statutes have not yet superseded the courts'
ruling. See, e.g., supra note 63.
95. See Dubroc v. Dubroc, 388 So.2d 377 (La. 1980); Cooper v. Allstate, Ins.
Co., 735 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
96. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d at 378.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 378.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 379.
204 [Vol. 19:189
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss1/8
CONTRACTUAL CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION
port their children.'0 4 However, it went on to say that "[t]here is
no prohibition, however, expressed by the law against a spouse's
agreement to suspend his right 0 5 to compel the other parent
without custody to turn over to him in advance money necessary
for the child's maintenance."0 6 Thus, the court held that "if the
parties clearly agree to a suspension of the payments, 0 7 and such
agreement does not interrupt the child's maintenance or upbring-
ing or otherwise work to his detriment, the agreement should be
enforced." 0
In Cooper v. Allstate Ins. Co., the court did not support the
proposition that parents could reduce future support payments;
however, it did hold that the parties could agree to change the
method of payment.1 9 In this case, the father was ordered to pay
$120 per week in child support." 0 Since his job only paid him
twice a month, he and the mother agreed that he would pay twice
a month the amount of $240 and additionally, the father would
provide health insurance for the children and school tuition pay-
ments for one child. 1" The father upheld the agreement, paying
$240 twice a month, having $612 deducted from his paycheck for
insurance premiums and paying $811 in private school tuition.1 1 2
There was nothing in the agreement that jeopardized the child's
right to support. Accordingly the court allowed the agreement."13
In both of these cases the court allowed the parents to modify
the court-ordered child support payments. The parents were
given a conditional right to form their own contract. That right
was conditioned on the basis that the parents could not completely
destroy their duty of support to the child. The Louisiana courts go
104. Id. at 380 ("Since the parent's duty of support and upbringing is a legal
duty owed to the child it cannot be renounced or suspended.").
105. Id. The right the court is referring to is the right of action the custodial
spouse is given to compel the non-custodial spouse "to turn over in advance the
money necessary to contribute toward the child's maintenance." Id. This right is
given so to encourage enforcement of the duty of support. Id.
106. Id. at 380.
107. Dubroc expressly stated that the court was not referring to unilateral
action on the part of the parents, specifically the supporting parent. Dubroc, 388
So. 2d at 379.
108. Id. at 380.
109. Cooper, 735 S.W.2d at 206.
110. Id. at 205.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 206.
113. Id. ("The agreement did not compromise future payments because mother
and father did not agree to reduce payments.").
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further in that they allow an actual reduction of payments when
the reduction is premised on some kind of consideration. 114
IV. WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE: ADDING A BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD TEST To RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW
The courts should allow parties to contractually modify sup-
port orders as to arrearages and future support payments as well
as to the method of payment and any other provisions, so long as
the agreement does not jeopardize the best interests of the child.
The first prong of the proposed analysis to establish the validity of
the child support agreement is to examine the agreement using
traditional rules of contract law. This includes examining
whether the contract was unconscionable, lacking consideration,
or the product of any misrepresentation or overreaching. If this
first prong is satisfied, meaning the agreement itself is valid as a
contract, then the second prong which tests the validity of the
child support agreement must be satisfied. The contract must be
in the best interests of the child, so not to thwart the child's right
to support and upbringing. If the agreement meets both of these
requirements then it will be enforced by the court.
The courts should allow parents to contractually settle arrear-
ages because these past due payments accrue to the custodial par-
ent and not to the child."' The child has already received support
and any collection process taken is done to reimburse the custo-
dial parent for care already given to the child. The reasoning that
a parent is actually a type of decree creditor"' takes into account
the reality of the situation when the supporting parent falls
behind in payments. Thus the courts should allow the custodial
114. See Hernandez v. Hernandez, 640 So. 2d 818 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(agreement to increase child support if two sons went to live with their mother);
Trisler v. Trisler, 622 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (agreement to reduce child
support due to financial difficulties of supporting parent); Timm v. Timm, 511 So.
2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (agreement to help refinance primary residence of
custodial parent and for reduction in child support due from non-custodial
parent); Patrick v. Patrick, 496 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (agreement to
reduce future child support when daughter married); Le Glue v. Le Glue, 404 So.
2d 1268 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (agreement for father to take two of four children and
not pay for their support).
115. Cochran v. Poole, 272 S.E.2d 301 (Ga. 1980) (example of court adopting an
oral agreement of the parties).
116. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 716 P.2d 496, 499 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986).
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parent to "waive, give, release, compromise, sell, enforce, or do
nothing with his or her decree receivable."1 17
Courts should also allow parents to contractually modify
future support payments. The custodial parent is contracting to
give up her right to compel the other spouse to pay support in
advance and not contracting away the child's right to support."
l 8
The court would retain the ability to examine whether the con-
tract is in the best interests of the child.119 The child is not a
party to the contract. If the agreement threatens the child's right
to support or is any way detrimental to the child's well-being, the
court may and should invalidate the agreement.
Any provision that completely takes away the right of a party
to go to court to modify future child support payments will be
invalid as against public policy. Any such provision would be
against the best interests of the child, because it would be limiting
the remedies available to the custodial parent and jeopardizing
the future of the child. A good contract will be held to be valid by
the court and will only be unenforceable when it is not in the best
interests of the child. A contract not in the best interests of the
child would be against the public policy of the state. 120 The par-
ents will be encouraged to reach an agreement that considers the
child's needs, because the parents will want a valid and enforcea-
ble agreement. Additionally, with the power to contractually mod-
ify support payments parties can more easily deal with a change
in circumstances, or other contingencies, which occur over time,
while saving the time and expense of going to court.
V. CONCLUSION
State courts are currently split over what legal effect they
give to private agreements between parents to modify past due
and future child support payments. The traditional trend, as to
contracting over arrearages, is not to enforce the agreements. The
modern trend is to treat arrearages as a judgment accruing to the
117. Id. at 500.
118. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d at 379-80.
119. Therefore, the courts are not foreclosed from exercising their jurisdiction
over child support. The courts retain the power of declaring the contracts as
"inadequate, overreaching, unconscionable or otherwise invalid.. . ." Davis v.
Davis, 306 S.E.2d 247, 249 (Ga. 1983). However, at the same time the parent's
right to raise their child as they see fit is protected by their ability to enter into
private agreements. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
120. See supra note 66.
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custodial parent and as such enforce any contract that the parents
form settling those arrearages. As for contracting over future
child support payments, the vast majority of jurisdictions invali-
date the contracts as being against the public policy of the state to
protect the child's best interests. There currently exists a small
minority of jurisdictions that hold that it is not always against the
child's best interests to enforce contracts which modify future sup-
port payments. The only situation in which these jurisdictions
enforce a private agreement is when it is in the best interests of
the child. The parents have two challenges to overcome for such a
contract to be valid: the agreement itself must be valid as a con-
tract and it must not threaten the child's right to support.
As discussed in the above sections, the courts should utilize
the two-prong test, combining contract law and the best interests
of the child, for analyzing agreements concerning past and future
child support payments. Ultimately, it is the child's best interests
that are at stake and nothing should be done to jeopardize those
interests. That is why a test that analyzes an agreement under
contract principles and examines the agreement in light of the
best interests of the child is the test for the courts to adopt. It is
the best way for the courts to insure that a child receives the nec-
essary support and still give parents the freedom to reach an
agreement that is in everyone's best interests.
Lynette K Neel
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